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Abstract
This is an essay discussing how far the limits of intelligence can be stretched, 
without risking that it becomes counter-productive. It focuses primarily on 
Sweden and the concretisations are Swedish. However, I believe that every 
country suffers from its own hypocrisy and I therefore guess that the reader 
can find similarities if he or she digs into his or her native country’s everyday 
intelligence operations. What is more, I believe that it is urgent, in order to 
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Intelligent suicide?1
1. This is an essay discussing how far the limits of intelligence can be stretched, 
without risking that it becomes counter-productive. It focuses primarily on 
Sweden and the concretisations are Swedish. However, I believe that every 
country suffers from its own hypocrisy and I therefore guess that the reader 
can find similarities if he or she digs into his or her native country’s everyday 
intelligence operations. What is more, I believe that it is urgent, in order to 
produce an intelligence worthy of the name, that recent developments are turned 
around. 
Democracy, the rule of law and human rights are not a question of what we 
write, even less what we say. Democracy, the rule of law and human rights are 
exclusively a question of what we do. Human rights mean concretising, seeing 
other people, focusing on other people’s rights instead of on our own. Every 
other position is counter-productive, when it comes to defending human rights, 
and this kind of hypocrisy promotes only the kind of cynicism that tears societies 
apart – as well as creating good arguments for terrorists.
2. Ylmaz Murad is an Iraqi refugee, granted Swedish citizenship in 1989, who 
came to Sweden in 1982. Murad was unfortunate enough to meet Majid Abdel-
Karim Husain just a month later, when the Swedish immigration authorities 
decided that they were to share an apartment, during the Swedish asylum-seeking 
process. 
Just like Murad, Husain originated from Iraq. This is, however, more or less 
the only thing they had in common, when they met for the first time, Murad 
as a common refugee, one among hundreds, but Husain as a former member of 
Saddam Hussein’s bodyguard force. Murad fled in order not to be drafted into the 
war between Iraq and Iran. Husain fled when he was ordered to plant a bomb in 
Kuwait and arrange the bomb attack in a manner that pointed to Iranian agents 
as the perpetrators. The reason for his refusal was the arrangement: together with 
two other persons, Husain was supposed to plant the bomb in a Kuwait refinery 
and then kill the other two, putting Iranian passports in their pockets. When 
he refused to kill these two persons, it was made clear that this refusal would 
be regarded as a military offence with death as the penalty. Husain then fled to 
different countries in Europe, turning to the UN refugee committee as well as to 
the CIA, trying to tell his story and sell information in exchange for getting his 
wife and his three children out of Iraq. His attempts were unsuccessful.  
1 The essay originates from my speech at the first Ethics and Intelligence Conference, held in 





Finally, Husain ended up in Sweden and, in the flat in Märsta, a suburb of 
Stockholm, he met Murad. Sharing the same apartment, Husain finally confided 
in Murad, telling him more and more details about his background, including 
information he had received during his time as an agent. Together they started 
to write down this information, mainly in Arabic, anonymously publishing well-
informed, critical articles in the exile press, also in English. Some of these articles 
became leading stories in the Arabic press in the Middle East, first published in the 
Iraqi exile news magazine Al-Tayar.2 The purpose was to blackmail Iraq officials 
in order to force them to allow Husain’s family to emigrate from Iraq. Becoming 
more and more desperate, the strategy failing and with western intelligence 
not sufficiently interested in the information to help him, Husain finally – in 
December 1984 – phoned the Iraqi Embassy in Algeria, threatening to reveal 
even more embarrassing information about Iraq’s involvement in terrorism et 
cetera and even approached a leading Swedish newspaper, giving it not only 
some parts of the stories but also allowing it to listen to secretly recorded tapes, 
confirming his story.3 Amash, the then Iraqi Ambassador in Helsinki, Finland, 
who had previously unsuccessfully attempted to help Husain to get his family 
out of Iraq, was also informed that he was going to be assassinated. All this 
information was also forwarded to the Swedish Security Service (SS), but with 
no reaction.  
Iraq decided to respond – enough was enough. On 9 January 1985, Husain 
walked into a classical trap, when a woman, visiting Murad’s and Husain’s 
apartment, asked him to accompany her to the commuter train. On 17 March, 
Majid was found murdered in a suburban forest near Stockholm. His body had 
been cut into 53 pieces, with cuts to the lips, the genitals et cetera, sending the 
necessary message. In the same month in which Husain made the fatal mistake, 
but this time, on the 30 January, Ambassador Amash was murdered by the poison 
thalium, well known as a weapon used by Iraqi intelligence. Later the same year, 
on 6 December 1985, the Local District Court of Stockholm decided to issue a 
detention order for a women, working for Iraqi intelligence and known as Nina 
and, according to some sources, also as Leyla. Her real name is Jamila Mustafa El-
Chafej. She has still not been captured, but after the SS discovered, following the 
work of a foreign intelligence organisation, that there might be a breakthrough 
in the hunt, it decided on 31 October 2007 to advertise both in Sweden and 
Iraq for information about not only Jamila Mustafa El-Chafej but also two other 
suspected male perpetrators, Ali Abid Hussein and Ali Mowafak Hussein. On 23 
November4 2007, another former Iraqi citizen was taken into custody, accused 
2 Al-Tayar Al-Jadeed, Horrific plans 29/10/1984.
3 Reference to the article in Svenska Dagbladet, Ola Säll, ”Byter spionuppgifter mot asyl” 
17/12/1984.
4 http://www.sakerhetspolisen.se/publicerat/nyhetsarkiv/nyheter2007/ sakerhetspolisensoke
rinformationomkvinna.5.36d06326115d10d5bae800079.html Also Aftonbladet, De söks i 
styckmordsfallet, 8/11/2007.
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of complicity in the case. The reader should regard this suddenly awakening of 
interest in the case with some critical scepticism. 
As soon as Husain was found murdered, the media naturally contacted 
Murad. Murad was very disappointed, angry and afraid, accusing the Swedish 
police, especially the SS, of negligence, causing the death of Husain. The 
background story of Husain and the SS’s handling of the case now became 
public. A discussion also started, implying that the cause of the negligence might 
be found in the sensitive mediation role Sweden and Olof Palme had played in 
the Iran-Iraq war. It leaked out that the SS had recommended that Husain’s 
application for residence should be rejected and that they wanted him expelled. 
There was also a connection between Husain and a major spy case in Norway, 
the so-called Treholt affair, connections which now became public, just like the 
Swedish Government’s hesitation to follow the advice of the SS to deny Husain 
residence and instead expel him. The criticism against the SS was massive, but 
the head of the SS denied all negligence and even any form of mistake.5 It is an 
understatement to claim that the involved SS officials were somewhat annoyed 
with Murad and the publicity. 
As a result, the SS started to show a great deal of interest in Murad. Until 
the murder of Husain, the SS had only had the regular form of contact with 
Murad they usually have with immigrants, at least with immigrants from 
the Middle East. This means that, as a modus operandi, the SS, using their 
important role as a reference before the Government decides on a matter of 
permanent residence or citizenship, regularly interrogate the refugee, attempting 
to obtain information about his/her home country and fellow citizens, switching 
between promises of citizenship for him/her and his/her relatives and threats 
that he/she will be expelled. This type of harassment is everyday life for most 
refugees who arrive in Sweden, at least as long as they originate from a country 
outside the western hegemony. There is nothing personal in this harassment, it 
is just part of professionalism within the organisation – take good care of all the 
possible instruments you have, they may turn out up to be perfect for obtaining 
the information you want. Having a hold on somebody works efficiently both 
against those who are scared to lose something and against those who want to 
gain something, to be able to be a part of the community.
5 This was the main story in all major newspapers in Sweden this day and the following weeks, 
here just two examples: Aftonbladet, 21/3/1985: Lars Ohlsson, Agenten som ingen trodde 
(The agent no-one believed), Lars Ohlsson, Ville vittna mot Treholt (Offered himself to testify 
against Treholt), Bengt Michanek, Säpo-chefen: Vi har inte gjort fel (Head of SS: We have note 
done anything wrong), Thomas Jonasson, Invandrarminister: Utredningar tar tid (Minister 
of immigration: Asylum investigations takes time), and Svenska Dagbladet, 21/2/1985: Lars 
Berne, Avhoppad Irakagent offer för styckmordet (Iraq defector victim of the cutting-up assas-
sination), Håkan Bergström, Husains kamrat inte rädd (Husains friend is not afraid), Margit 
Silberstein, Invandrarverket: Saknade skäl att få asyl (Immigration office: He did not have rea-
sons enough to receive asylum), Margit Silberstein, Husain fruktade att bli kidnappad (Husain 





Since the murder, it seems as though the SS are convinced that Husain was a 
real defector. Another reason for this new interest in Murad is that they (correctly) 
suspected that Murad might have some information, originating from Husain. 
Initially, Murad admitted that he had this information, but later – because of 
anger with and distrust of the Swedish police – he denied this and refused to give 
any information whatsoever to the police. Together with the well-founded and 
now also publicly communicated, severe criticism of the police, especially the SS, 
this made the contact between the SS and Murad increasingly tense.
As a result, Murad’s application for citizenship, which was opposed by the 
SS, was pending until 1989, when the entire leadership of the SS was sacked 
and replaced by a new management team.6 From this time until 1998, Murad’s 
life became normal. He found a woman and they started to share a life together 
with her three children. The family lived a traditional lower middle-class life and 
Murad never told his common-law wife anything about the disturbances in the 
past. He had left that behind him. 
In 1996, Murad got a permanent job at Arlanda Airport, working with 
catering. As a member of Schengen, Sweden became obliged to conduct a 
terrorist check, a vetting procedure, at airports. In Sweden, this is done through 
a so-called register control,7 handled by the SS and the Register Board.8 
In the spring of 1998, a register control was conducted at Arlanda. It revealed 
that the SS held a file on Ylmaz Murad, but with no recordings younger than 
ten years. According to the internal rules for the SS, nowadays formalised in 
statutory law, all files in which there are no new recordings for the last ten years 
are to be regarded as inactive and no information is to be handed out in register 
control matters. The vetting procedure is handled by officials at the SS, even 
though it is the Register Board which makes the decision about whether or not 
to pass on the information. In Murad’s case, the check of Murad against the 
SS files was handled by the same SS official that was a leading person in the 
harassment of Murad in the 1980s. This man, well aware of the ten-year rule, 
decided that the Register Board was to be informed of the unfounded suspicions 
relating to Murad and invented by the SS in the aftermath of the assassination 
of Husain, presented in a way that prevented the Register Board realising how 
old they were. Murad was then called to a “security meeting” by the SS, but he 
was denied the opportunity to see or be informed more specifically about why he 
6 As a result of revealed illegal bugging, see Töllborg, Under Cover. The Swedish Security Police 
and their Modi Operandi, in Fijnaut/Marx (ed), Police Surveillance in Comparative Perspective 
[Kluwer 1995].
7 Previously labelled personnel control, see Töllborg, Personalkontroll [Symposium 1986], also 
Töllborg (ed), National Security and the Rule of Law [Centrum för Europaforskning, Göte-
borgs universitet 1997].
8 For the procedure et cetera, see Cameron/Töllborg, Internal Security in Sweden, in Brodeur/
Gill/Töllborg (ed), Democracy, Law and Security [Ashgate 2003]. Also Cameron, National Se-
curity and the European Convention on Human Rights [Juridiska fakulteten i Uppsala, Årsbok 
2000]).
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was supposed to lack “civic reliability”, as the Swedish authorities prefer to call it. 
The Register Board decided to pass on the information and Murad was sacked 
with immediate effect.9 
Without income, Murad applied for hundreds of different jobs, but who, at 
least in Sweden, hires a person with an Arabic name and Arabic appearance, who 
has been sacked after suspicions from the SS and the Register Board of being 
a terrorist? Finally, Murad started a gift shop in a suburb of Stockholm, but it 
did not make enough money to live on, let alone finance a family with three 
children. 
The harassment now began again, this time also aimed at his common-law 
wife and the children. The harassment, together with the non-existent economy, 
finally caused the relationship to collapse. Murad, unemployed and with no 
money, was forced to move into the shop, with only cold water and no heating. 
For the following three years, he lived in the shop, staying alive using the small 
income from the shop (which only took care of the rent), collecting cans and 
receiving support from friends and people in the neighbourhood. 
During the period after he was sacked, Murad tried all the different legal 
opportunities to obtain redress. He asked the SS and the Register Board for 
permission to see his file, in order to be able to defend himself, he appealed 
against the refusals to both the Administrative Court of Appeal (Kammarrätten) 
and the Supreme Administrative Court (Regeringsrätten), both instances 
denying him this, referring to national security, without even looking into the 
files.10 Finally, the SS officer whose specific task it was to keep an eye on Murad, 
well aware of the fact that the SS did not have any substantial suspicions against 
Murad whatsoever, seeing him suffer, decided that everything had gone too far 
and decided to inform the heads of the SS. In the autumn of 2001, the then new 
head of the SS11 decided to report the SS to the Chancellor of Justice, because 
of its handling of the Murad case, and the Register Board supported the report, 
including its own handling of the matter and also stating that Murad must be 
given damages.12 
On 3 June 2002, the Government’s lawyer, the Chancellor of Justice, Göran 
Lambertz, decided that the SS had mistreated Murad and the National Police 
Board was therefore instructed to pay financial damages corresponding to the 
loss of six months’ pay.13 This meant SEK 110,460 crowns, or approx. 11,750 € 
9 Luftfartsverket (Civil Aviation Authority), Beslut i registerkontrollärende (Decision in register 
control matter) 29/5/1998 (Hans Karlstrand) and Gategourmet, Decision to sack Murad 
9/6/1998 (Ulf Schönborg).
10 SS SA 187-4151-99, Stockholm Administrative Court of Appeal (Kammarrätten i Stock-
holm), Judgement 12/5/2000 case no. 2017-2000, and Supreme Administrative Court 
(Regeringsrätten), Judgement 30/8/2000, case no. 4152-2000.
11 Jan Danielsson.
12 SS SA 990-7978-01, Register Board (Registernämnden) 8/5/2002, dnr 34/02.





before tax. After tax, this is approx. 7,200 €, less than half what the Chancellor 
of Justice earns every month. For the stigmatisation, for the loss of his family, for 
the loss of his life, in other words the infringement, Murad was not entitled to 
any damages, according to Mr Lambertz. The European Convention for Human 
Rights was not applicable and no national law gave the right to compensation, 
all according to Mr Lambertz. Several earlier decisions by the Government, in 
vetting cases, to pay damages for infringements of SEK 100,000 to eight other 
victims14 and SEK 400,000 to one other (Leander, see below) were not relevant, 
according to the judgement by Lambertz. Murad appealed to the Government, 
which rejected his appeal in a decision dated 24 October 2002.15
On 6 June 2006, the European Court of Human Rights decided, by seven 
votes to zero and on four articles (8, 10, 11 and 13), that the refusal to give the 
five applicants the right to see and correct information in the files of the SS 
was a breach of the convention and granted them damages for the infringement 
of between 3,000 and 7,000 €.16 However, in a decision in March 2007, ten 
months after the verdict, the Chancellor of Justice refused to follow the decision 
by the Court in another complaint, based on the judgement of the ECHR.17
Murad, who now has left Sweden and returned to Iraq, has still not received 
any redress. Just before he left, I met him and he said that it had been easier to 
live with the same harassment in Iraq under the Saddam regime than it was in 
Sweden. In Iraq, people had at least believed him, when he told them about the 
harassment, but in Sweden no one could see or even imagine. His point is worth 
considering.
3. In 1979, I was 25 years old and had recently graduated from law school. 
In the autumn of that year, a Mr Leander contacted me. After only one week’s 
work, he had been sacked from his job as a carpenter at the Naval Museum. The 
reasons given were that he failed the vetting procedure – he was, according to the 
SS, to be regarded as a security risk without any concrete details being given. 
The Naval Museum is and was open to the public, photography is and was 
permitted and back in the 1970s there were more than 50,000 visitors every 
year. At the time, the number of security-classified posts was secret, as well as the 
number of vetting procedures every year. These figures were classified as being 
of the utmost importance for national security.18 We now know that there were, 
and are, more than 410,000 posts with a security classification – fairly high 
for a population of nine million – and sometimes more than 200,000 vetting 
14 Borås tidning 29/6/2001.
15 Swedish Government, Department of Justice, dnr Ju2002/4497/L2.
16 ECHR, Case of Segerstedt-Wiberg and others v. Sweden, application no. 62332/00.
17 Chancellor of Justice, decision 13/5/ 2007, dnr  4456-06-40.
18 RPS/SÄK SA 449-737-81, Department of Justice (Justitiedepartementet) dnr 3207-81 and 
RPS/Säk SA 248-998-81.
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procedures every year.19 At the time, none of the vetted citizens was allowed to see 
any concretisation of the allegations; all they were told was that they lacked “civic 
reliability” and that the SS was forbidden, also according to the Constitution, to 
file anyone merely because of his or her political affiliation.
With this, we went to the European Court of Human Rights. In 1987, 
we received a verdict. The Court decided, with the four votes of the Swedish 
Marshal of the Realm, the Turkish judge, the English judge and the German 
judge against the other three, the Norwegian chairman, together with the French 
and the Italian judge, that there was no breach of the Convention.20 Ten years 
later, in 1997, I was finally able to force the Government to let me read Mr 
Leander’s file. I made the content public and the Government
admitted that their case at the European Court for Human Rights had been •	
based on false information, with the responsible Swedish counsellor, Mr Hans 
Corell, for the Guardian claiming that he was “only obeying orders”,21 
gave Leander a public apology,•	
paid Leander damages (SEK 400,000 tax free) and•	
publicly declared that Leander was not and never had been a security risk.•	 22
The file showed that the reason the SS became interested in Leander back in 
1968 was that he, as a 16-year-old child, “is selling the VC’s (VietCong, FNL) 
school publication at his school and account to the VC office”.23 This, for us 
somewhat shocking, fact should be seen against at least one of several statements 
by Mr Corell, this one taken from the secret hearing in front of the European 
Commission of Human Rights on 10 October 1983:  
“Mr President, of course it would be much easier to defend this case if I 
were free to disclose the full information, but I am not authorised to do this. 
I can, however, give you the information that it is suspected that organised 
attempts are being made to try to force the security filter surrounding 
the personnel control system (insinuating me, working on my doctoral 
thesis, of course, DT) … If the Commission were to consider that the 
Convention obliges the State to grant the citizens of Sweden access to the 
secret police files, such a decision would mean a winding-up of the entire 
security police work in Sweden. I ask myself what will be the impact of 
such a decision on similar security police work in other member states. Mr 
President, I dare not guess…”24
19 SOU 1990:51, p 233.
20 ECHR Judgment of 26 March 1987, application no. 9248/81.
21 Walker, EU rights law rests on Swedish lies, The Guardian, 30/12/01997.
22 Swedish Government, decision 27/11/ November 1997.
23 SS, file LEANDER Torsten, 510220-0051, file A4, p 8.
24 Verbatim Record, Secret Hearing in the Leander case, European Commission of Human 





This is what was handed out:25
“In 1970 in August, LEANDER contacted the office of the KFML 
(nowadays SKP) in Stockholm, ordering 8,000 copies of the KFML 
election appeal and posters.26
He claimed that he was a member of the Stockholm department of Clarté, 
but was temporarily residing in Karlshamn, to where he wanted the material 
sent. He was going to work in the Karlshamn area with propaganda until 
the election.27
In October 1970, it emerged that he had applied for membership of the 
Stockholm department of the KFML.28 
In 1978, during the period 29-30 April, FiB/Kulturfront had its annual 
meeting in Norrköping. In all probability, LEANDER participated at this 
meeting, since his car was seen parked in the playground of the school 
where the meeting was held. The playground was let as a parking lot only 
for participants at the meeting. The association FiB/Kulturfront, which 
issues a publication with the same name, is an association in which the 
SKP has important influence.”29 
After the case had been won, Mr Corell was offered the post as head of the 
SS by the Government, an offer he rejected. Instead, he successfully demanded 
Swedish lobbying to be Under-Secretary-General for Legal Affairs and United 
Nations Legal Counsel.30 This is a well-known fact in Sweden, at least among 
lawyers who want to have a career and are therefore interested in how people are 
supposed to act and what they should absolutely not do.
Perhaps this explains what happened in 2005, when the Swedish Foreign 
Department was caught lying to the UN Torture Committee. Sweden was 
subsequently caught with her trousers down.31 Otherwise, how are we to explain 
how normally decent and honest Government officials decide to lie even in front 
25 SS, Personalkontroll 27/8/1979, dnr 5:9/4 d p. 830 U 15956/79.
26 The election was nationwide, with both the KFML and SKP as legally acknowledged parties.
27 Clarté was a youth organisation, whose members included most leftist politicians, including 
the former social democratic prime minister of Sweden, Tage Erlander.
28 There were no signals whatsoever that representing these parties was to be considered to in-
volve a threat against national security. On the contrary, as the Government pointed out, even 
the Swedish Constitution explicitly forbids registration merely because of political affiliation.
29 There is still some uncertainty about whether this last paragraph was handed out, since it 
was marked with a cross from a pencil. FiB-Kulturfront was a large leftist paper, which once 
revealed that Sweden had secret military intelligence, with extremely good connections with the 
social democratic party, mainly involved in taking up the fight against the communists.
30 To be fair, it might have helped him, having the post he so much wanted, that the Swedish 
judge in the ECHR when deciding in the Leander Case, the Marshal of the Realm, was Gun-
nar Lagergren, an older colleague of Mr Corell (Sweden is indeed a small country). Lagergren’s 
daughter is married to Kofi Annan.
31 May 2005. See yearbook 2005 Swedish Helsinki Committee.
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of a UN Committee and this in an issue on which Sweden has always otherwise 
been a leading figure? My guess is that not only children, but also authorities, even 
intelligence, do not look upon and reflect on what we say – they act according 
to how we act. This explains why human rights can never be a question of what 
we say or what we write, not even what we teach and examine, it can only be a 
question of what we do.
The revelation of the Leander files led to a public outcry, which forced the 
Government to start several official investigations. With his experience from 
Canada, Jean-Paul Brodeur has described the standard procedure for handling 
this kind of crisis: first, firm denial, complemented by disparaging comments 
about the critics, often combined with political accusations. If this fails, use 
deniability, join the critics and categorically dissociate from the criticised. “Then 
comes the moment of insinuation; even admitting the practice is evil, it is asked, 
can we do without it? … Finally comes the solution: the practice is going to be 
allowed, but on a limited and controlled basis, the controls being either legal or 
administrative, or both.”32
Brodeur’s analysis fits well with experience from Sweden. I would like to give 
the reader three examples from these investigations.
Firstly; as a member of a research committee, a research project initiated by 
the Government due to political pressure after the revelation of the Leander 
files, I asked the SS for information on the number of employees, their age 
and their gender, from the period 1965 to 2000. Firstly, the SS denied me 
this information. When I was able not only to tell them the present number 
of employees but also to show them in written detail how easily I could work 
this out, they changed their decision and verified my figures, supplementing 
the number with information about the average age and the percentage of the 
different sexes, but only with the facts relevant at the time (this was in 2000). 
For the other years, 1965, 1970 et cetera, they were unable (and are still unable), 
claiming reasons of importance for national security, to give any information. I 
naturally appealed the decision to the same Administrative Court of Appeal and 
the Supreme Administrative Court which has tried, and rejected, both Murad’s 
and Leander’s appeal to see their files. And I lost! According to the courts, it 
would have a detrimental effect on national security for me, in spite of being 
the head of a Governmental research project, and being prepared to accept an 
obligation to observe silence, to be informed even of the number of employees at 
the SS in 1965!33 It seems as though the courts here all too eagerly followed Lord 
Denning: “When national security is at stake, even the rules of natural justice 
may have to be modified to meet the position”.34
32 Jean-Paul Brodeur, Undercover Policing in Canada: A Study of its Consequences. In Fijnaut/
Marx (ed), Undercover. Police surveillance in comparative perspective, p 98.
33 SS SA 187-2140-98, Stockholm Administrative Court of Appeal (Kammarrätten i Stockholm), 
Judgement 13/3/ 2000, case no. 1167-2000 and Supreme Administrative Court (Regeringsrätten), 
Decision 19/12/2000 case no. 1808-2000.
34 Quoted from Lustgarten/Leigh, In from the Cold. National Security and Parliamentary 





Secondly; after the revelation of the Leander file, the Register Board was tasked 
with attempting to find out whether there were other “Leander cases”. The first 
investigation by the Register Board revealed that there were at least 1,001 more 
suspected “Leander cases”.35 In its first investigation, the Register Board was 
understaffed and lacked the time to go into depth and check all the suspected 
cases. So, after the first report, it asked the Government for an extension of the 
mission. The Government really did not have any choice. It then decided that, 
instead of going into depth in these 1,001 identified, suspected “Leander cases”, 
the Register Board was to advertise in the daily newspapers for people who could 
personally ask the Register Board to check their presumptive files. The 1,001 
suspected “Leander cases” were not contacted and told exactly that they should 
perhaps ask for such an investigation – the only thing that was done was to 
advertise and this was done in the middle of the summer and in liberal daily 
newspapers (once, or maybe twice), telling people about this opportunity. There 
was no advertisement in leftist papers. Moreover, if anyone wanted the Register 
Board to check a possible file, he/she had to (a) write down why he/she thought 
that the SS might have a file on him/her and (b) accept that both this reason, 
given by him/herself, and, if anything whatever was filed about him/her it would 
subsequently be made public for the whole world. Some of this information 
was later found in a Nazi death register, created by some neo-Nazis in Sweden! 
The result was that only 192 Swedish citizens asked for this investigation and of 
them only 22 came from the 1,001 people the Board had previously identified as 
being presumptive “Leander cases”. Only 27 of the applicants were found in the 
SS’s files.36 Of them, the Register Board found that, in 16 cases, i.e. more than 
50 per cent, some mistakes had been made and, in six cases, about 20 per cent, 
the security screening had damaged the applicant in an unreasonable way. These 
six were later awarded damages from the Government.37 However, a further five 
victims were subsequently awarded damages, followed by a further one, which 
the Register Board had incorrectly – also according to the Government nowadays 
– claimed was filed on solid grounds.38  
Thirdly; the Government also ordered an investigation about what military 
intelligence might have done in the past. In December 1998, the supervisory 
organ for military intelligence, the Swedish Intelligence Commission, SIC 
(Försvarets Underrättelsenämnd, with what is, for this ”supervisory” organ, 
the most appropriate abbreviation, FUN, in Swedish), presented its report on 
military intelligence, one of the different missions the Government was forced to 
35 Registernämnden (Register Board), Personalkontroll den 1 oktober 1969-den 30 juni 1996, 
Rapport till regeringen av Registernämnden beslutad den 16 december 1998.
36 Registernämnden (Register Board), Personalkontroll Del II. Fortsatt uppdrag av regeringen 
den 31 mars 1999 om utlämnande av uppgifter ur SÄPO-registret den 1 oktober 1969-den 30 
juni 1996, Rapport till regeringen av Registernämnden den 3 oktober 2000.
37 Borås tidning 29/6/2001, also Siren 6/7/2002 and www.newsdesk.se/view/34957.
38 Department of Justice Ju2002/6434/PO.
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initiate after the revelation of the content of the Leander file.39 The SIC was and 
is chaired by the former conservative minister of defence, Anders Björk. Björk 
decided to make a show of the release of the investigation, so the presentation was 
broadcast live by the Swedish National Television Company as a kind of open 
press conference for the public. The material the SIC presented also included 
details about a woman, presented in the report with her full name and identity, 
who had been subjected to illegal bugging for a period. As appears to be fairly 
common practice on the part of the Swedish National Security Service and, in 
this case, also military intelligence, the bug had been hidden in the woman’s 
bed.40 The woman herself was never given this information and was not informed 
before the broadcast press conference either that she had been bugged or that this 
was going to be made public!
In the report, there is no discussion whatsoever about the legality of the 
operation, the extent to which this kind of illegal method was common or not, 
the circumstances that made it important to place the bug in the bed and whether 
the ethical arguments for/against had been discussed before the operation. 
Instead, on television, and at the press conference, the chairman of the SIC, 
Anders Björk, on his own initiative, decided to make the audience aware of this 
bugging operation, including the full name of the woman, but with no other 
reflection than trying to make fun of the fact that all the military intelligence got 
out of the operation was, in the chairman’s own words, “some panting”.41
Björk is still chairman of this supervisory organ.
4. All this harassment and all these lies, so obvious and so stupidly strange and 
unnecessary, can only be understood as developing from a culture where what 
is true and what are lies appear to be regarded from an instrumental perspective 
rather than a moral one. The problem is not only that this disease has spread to 
the civil society; it is also, in my view, counter-productive when it comes to the 
quality of intelligence work.
It is undisputable that intelligence is both necessary and important. At the 
same time, we are all aware of how difficult it is to produce significant intelligence 
of good quality. 
Intelligence shares one specific difficulty with other kinds of pro-active 
policing. It is pro-active, not re-active; as a result, its main objective is not to find 
the offender but the (presumptive) crime. To some extent, this both is and has 
to be enough. It is better to know your enemy than to catch him, since the catch 
only opens a vacuum to be filled by another. Then you have to start looking 
again. One important consequence is that successful intelligence is as much as 
39 Försvarets underrättelsenämnd, Redovisning av vissa uppgifter om den militära underrät-
telse- och säkerhetstjänsten 26/11/1998.
40 ibid p 66.





successful policing – pro-active or re-active – mainly dependent on HUMINT, 
in other words based on good contacts with people who have insight into the 
environments of interest. The public is, and will always be, most important.
HUMINT is based on trust – or fear. Good intelligence tends to be more 
dependent on trust than fear, since information that comes from fear is more 
often motivated from a utilitarian angle than information based on trust. 
You earn trust – difficult to gain, easy to lose. If intelligence designed to 
realise politically determined goals is primarily steered by policy, giving answers 
politicians and other benefactors demand, when these, as is so often the case, mix 
defending their own established position with national security, the result will 
most definitely be lack of trust among those from which intelligence most needs 
it. This might lead to a vicious circle: if you cannot have quality HUMINT, you 
become more and more dependent on SIGINT and other technical measures, 
all too unsophisticated ever to replace good quality HUMINT and all too 
general in their surveillance not to risk being regarded as threatening even to the 
trustworthy. Forgetting what was already learned so painfully from the Church 
Committee, the MacDonald Commission, the Lund Commission et cetera, no 
matter whether this Alzheimer’s depends on ignorance or just plain stupidity, 
it not only condemns us to repeat history but might even force intelligence to 
base its future information gathering on fear – notwithstanding what this might 
mean for analysts and what kind of analysts we may attract to intelligence.
5. It really is a paradox that what Baader-Meinhof was striving for, but so 
fortunately failed to achieve, Bin Ladin has now succeeded, with a little help 
from his former friends, in making a reality. As soon as the USA was attacked, 
democracy showed itself to be too poorly internalised to stand up to the attack. 
Leaders in Europe, with England and Sweden as their forerunners, are now all 
too eager to learn from the new continent, claiming reasons of national security 
when it is all a question of securing their own established position. Just take 
two terms – terrorism and national security, combine them and the entire legal 
system at national and international level has suddenly been turned upside down 
to the extent that it even risks committing hara-kiri. War becomes peace, we 
torture in the name of humanity, abolishing human rights in order to defend… 
yes, to defend what? We obtain total transparency into everyone’s life, even into 
our bedrooms, but no transparency into power. Claim openness, practise secrecy 
– hypocrisy becomes normality. As a result, the only way to save the values 
which are the foundations of a democracy, based on human rights, is to give 
the new phenomena their correct names: intelligence can be called deaf and 
blind fact-inventing, politics utilitarian hypocrisy and law the autistic process of 
justification. Then we can at least save our language and thereby give concepts 
like democracy, the rule of law and human rights a fair chance to survive this 
dark period.
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It is perhaps time we learned something from changes in flight safety before 
and after this industry enforced, and internalised, transparency concerning not 
only technical and system-oriented defects but also human mistakes, weaknesses 
and incompetence. Perhaps history has taught us, in intelligence as well as in 
law and politics, that transparency is the only working measure against all our 
human preparedness to, in the name of the good, do the evil. So, just as the 
need once was apparent for asylum as an international legal weapon defending 
humanity and democracy, the same fight for whistle-blowers might be the only 
chance to save democracy from committing suicide in fear of death.
